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Authored by Steve Watson via Modernity News,

Britain's prisons are becoming recruitment grounds for Islamic gangs, with white inmates converting under threat of violence while the system frees terrorists early, jails protesters longer than child sex attackers, and racks up hundreds of millions housing foreign offenders.

New Ministry of Justice figures have exposed a stark reality inside England and Wales' jails. One in five Muslims behind bars is white - nearly four times the 5.8 per cent rate in the general population.

The number of white Muslim prisoners has climbed from 2,767 in 2022 to 3,218 by the end of June 2025, a 16 per cent rise. Overall Muslim inmates rose 14 per cent in the same period, from 14,037 to 16,051, now making up roughly 18 per cent of the prison population despite Muslims comprising just 6.5 per cent of the country.

? Read more https://t.co/b8r0O97xDs ??

— Daily Mail (@DailyMail) August 25, 2026

Shadow Justice Secretary Nick Timothy laid out the numbers and the implications. "The percentage of Muslims who are white in our prisons is so vastly higher than in the general population it raises serious questions," he said.

Islamist gangs control many of our prisons.

Conversion to Islam is the only way to stay safe from them.

I obtained data showing 1 in 5 Muslim prisoners are white.

That's four times higher than in the general population.

This cannot continue. pic.twitter.com/G87pfD7EoI

— Nick Timothy MP (@NJ_Timothy) August 25, 2026

"We know that experts have warned repeatedly about forced conversions taking place behind bars, driven by Islamic gangs. We need to be honest that something is not right here - Labour must urgently investigate and stamp out forced conversions in prison," he further urged.

Government advisers have documented the pattern for years. Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, described Islamist terrorists operating as "self-styled emirs" who controlled prisoners through "leadership and recruitment."

This included targeting "vulnerable or lonely prisoners, using guidance, sharing of food or material gifts" and "conversion backed by implicit or actual violence."

The London Bridge attacker Usman Khan, while inside, encouraged prisoners to take Muslim names and wear Muslim dress while trying to convert others.

Ian Acheson, who reviewed Islamist extremism in prisons, said conversions often occur "as a pragmatic response to who controls power and space in our prisons." In high-security jails especially, safety is at a premium and large numbers of violent young men seek belonging. "So Islam in this case has gang characteristics."

'We need to have much tighter regulation and control of the prison system'

Fiyaz Mughal, founder of Muslims Against Antisemitism, warns the UK prison system is failing to control violent Muslim gangs, leaving staff and inmates powerless. pic.twitter.com/TVdJzSr6Pa

— GB News (@GBNEWS) December 22, 2025

A 2023 government-commissioned review by Colin Bloom found gangs ordering new arrivals to become Muslim or face consequences. "Failure to identify as a Muslim meant that at best the new prisoner would be denied 'protection' from the dominant Muslim gang on that wing, or at worst the new prisoner would be subjected to violence and intimidation from that same gang."

A lawyer who regularly visits top-security prisons reported the process starts almost immediately. "This is something which will happen hours after arriving on a wing. Immediately they arrive in prison they slot into the gang hierarchy. In some cases there are entire floors dominated by Muslim gangs."

Some conversions are opportunistic - "convenience Muslims" seeking extra time for prayers or better halal food. Others are coerced. Qurans left on beds carry a clear message.

The Ministry of Justice insists it does not tolerate intimidation or faith-based coercion and claims prisons act swiftly. Yet the numbers keep rising, and there are now 140 Muslim chaplains compared with 87 for the Church of England.

This is the same prison system that continues to house thousands of foreign national offenders at enormous cost to the British taxpayer.

Figures show 10,487 foreign national offenders costing £629 million a year - money that could fund 16,500 police officers or 15,000 NHS nurses.

Albania tops the list, followed by Ireland and Poland. Deportations remain slow, tangled in missing documents, uncooperative origin countries, and European Convention on Human Rights claims.

Reform UK's prisons adviser Vanessa Frake called the bill "staggering." She noted the drawn-out process: discarded passports, slow diplomatic correspondence, refusals by origin countries, and Article 8 family-life claims. Even a deal to return 200 Albanian prisoners came with conditions and lower daily payments to Albania than the UK pays to keep them.

While foreign offenders and Islamist networks embed inside the system, the authorities have shown a different urgency when it comes to early release.

Zahid Iqbal, convicted in 2013 for plotting to bomb an Army base using an Al-Qaeda manual, was approved for release three years early despite previous non-compliance and warnings from prison and community managers.

Colin Sutton, Reform UK's crime adviser, called the decision "baffling." "This wasn't a guy in his bedroom cooking something up. This was somebody who arranged training. He had links with al-Qaeda. He was a proper terrorist."

Labour's broader early-release schemes have accelerated the emptying of cells to manage overcrowding. Thousands of offenders, including those convicted of violence, have been freed earlier than previous tariffs allowed. Even after partial pauses and exclusions for certain sex offences, the direction of travel remains clear: capacity management takes priority over consistent public protection.

Contrast that with the treatment of British citizens who protest the consequences of mass migration or speak out online. Lucy Connolly, already imprisoned for a single X post after the Southport attacks, faced the threat of recall to prison for reposting a satirical comment about Donald Trump and Keir Starmer. Probation officials treated the joke as "inciting violence" after an anonymous complaint.

In Essex, protests outside an asylum hotel housing Ethiopian migrant Hadush Kebatu erupted after he sexually assaulted a 14-year-old girl and a woman. Kebatu received 12 months. British protesters involved in the subsequent disorder received far longer terms.

Charlie Land got 32 months. Jonathan Glover got 30 months. Lee Gower, a local father and youth football coach, received two years and nine months. Other locals drew sentences of 22 to 33 months. Combined custodial terms for several of them exceeded 17 years - longer than the perpetrator who triggered the unrest.

 

Judges stressed that violence against police is unacceptable. Yet the sentencing disparity is unmistakable. Locals reacting to a sexual assault on a child by a small-boat arrival spend more time inside than the man who committed the assault.

Meanwhile white prisoners report pressure to convert for survival, foreign national offenders cost hundreds of millions, and convicted terrorists walk early under capacity rules.

Prisons reflect the wider failures of open borders and selective enforcement. Gangs exploit the vacuum. Vulnerable inmates adapt or suffer. Taxpayers foot the bill.

Ordinary Britons who notice and object face the sharp end of the law. The figures on white Muslim prisoners are not a statistical curiosity. They are the measurable result of a system that has lost control of its own institutions.

Authored by Luc Lelièvre via Mises Institute,

Loïc Wacquant and Murray Rothbard come from completely different worlds. Wacquant, in Punishing the Poor (2009), analyzes how modern states manage marginalized populations through policing and incarceration. Rothbard, in The Ethics of Liberty (1982), argues that the state is a monopoly of coercion and that real justice means restitution to victims rather than punishment imposed by the government. At first glance, they seem to have nothing in common. Yet, when you look closely at what each says about crime and punishment, they describe remarkably similar institutional dynamics: a penal system that does not exist to deliver justice but to maintain political power, control vulnerable communities, and satisfy the public's desire for punishment.

Wacquant argues that modern punishment targets not crime itself but people with low incomes. In Punishing the Poor, he writes that "it is not so much crime that is being fought, but the poor themselves." He attributes this dynamic to welfare retrenchment and what he interprets as neoliberal restructuring. This is Wacquant's interpretation. My purpose here is not to defend or refute it, but to summarize his institutional analysis and compare it with Rothbard's critique of state power. Wacquant's central point is that the penal system expands as social protections shrink, turning prisons into warehouses for people pushed out of the labor market. He portrays the United States as an expansive apparatus of social control in which punishment falls primarily on street crime while much white-collar wrongdoing is managed through administrative and legal processes.

Rothbard approaches the issue from a different angle. For him, crime is fundamentally an aggression against a person or their property. Justice should repair the victim. That means restitution - returning what was taken, plus a penalty for the harm done. In Rothbard's view, prison is a double injustice. It fails to compensate the victim and forces taxpayers to pay for the criminal's room and board. As one Mises Institute essay summarizes, "the victim receives nothing and is then 'robbed' once more through taxes to feed and house the criminal." Rothbard sees the prison system as wasteful, immoral, and fundamentally misaligned with justice. His alternative is clear: restitution, even if it must be paid through supervised work when the offender has no money.

Rothbard's critique is not only moral but also economic. In his landmark article "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach" (1968), Gary Becker reached a similar conclusion from a different perspective. Every sanction carries costs as well as benefits, and incarceration is among the most expensive. If restitution, fines, or compensated labor can deter crime while restoring victims, prison becomes difficult to justify except for dangerous offenders. Becker's analysis complements Rothbard's argument by showing that restitution is not merely ethically preferable - it is also economically superior.

Wacquant and Rothbard share an understanding of the state's role. Wacquant views the penal state as a bureaucratic arm of what he calls neoliberal governance, used to control marginalized populations. Rothbard views the penal state as a predatory institution that thrives on coercion. Both agree that the penal system tends to neglect victims, expand state power, and generate political legitimacy rather than genuine justice.

Their agreement becomes even more striking when viewed through the lens of institutional incentives. A penal bureaucracy does not merely administer justice; it sustains a network of police agencies, prosecutors, correctional officers, prison contractors, and public budgets, all of whose continued existence depends on the expansion of penal institutions. Restitution threatens this logic by shifting attention from the state to the victim. A system centered on repairing private harm requires fewer bureaucracies and leaves less room for political theater. From this perspective, incarceration persists not merely because citizens demand punishment, but because governments have institutional incentives to provide it.

René Girard, in Violence and the Sacred (1972), helps explain how punishment operates. Girard argues that societies have always used scapegoats to relieve social tension. In modern times, the criminal becomes that scapegoat, and the prison becomes the altar. As one Mises Institute essay notes, "the real product of the penal system is collective catharsis." Punishment is not a rational policy, it is a ritual. This is why voters demand harsher penalties even when prisons fail. This is why mass incarceration persists despite its cost and lack of results. Punishment satisfies a symbolic need, not a practical one.

Girard also helps explain why governments find this ritual politically useful. If societies repeatedly seek symbolic victims to restore social cohesion, the state becomes the institution that organizes and legitimizes those sacrifices. Public fear creates demand for punishment; political institutions supply it. Rothbard exposes the institutional side of this relationship, while Girard reveals its anthropological foundation. Together, they show how emotional expectations and bureaucratic incentives reinforce each other, enabling the penal system to expand even when it fails to reduce crime or compensate victims.

This is where Rothbard offers something Wacquant does not: a way out. Restitution replaces the sacrificial logic of punishment with a logic of repair. It shifts the focus from the offender to the victim, closes the moral account rather than leaving it open, and satisfies the need for justice without feeding the bureaucratic machine. In To Serve and Protect (1990), Bruce Benson shows that pre-state legal systems, such as Anglo-Saxon weregild, relied on restitution to prevent feuds and maintain peace. These systems worked because they focused on compensation rather than punishment.

Wacquant advocates "radical penal minimalism," a model that narrows the scope of punishment while preserving its democratic legitimacy. Rothbard calls for a justice system based on restitution rather than incarceration. Girard calls for an end to sacrificial violence. Benson shows how restitution can be implemented. Becker argues that incarceration is often less economically efficient than restitution, fines, and other alternative sanctions.

Despite their profound philosophical disagreements, all five raise serious doubts about the effectiveness and legitimacy of a prison-centered model of justice. Becker questions its efficiency. Benson presents historical alternatives. Girard exposes its sacrificial logic. Wacquant reveals its bureaucratic expansion. Rothbard offers restitution as a principled alternative.

The penal Leviathan will not disappear through abolitionist slogans or bureaucratic reforms. It will disappear only when justice ceases to be a ritual of punishment and becomes a process of repair. That requires reexamining the assumption that crime should be understood primarily as an offense against the state rather than as an injury to identifiable victims. Once the victim again becomes the central figure in justice, restitution naturally replaces punishment as the primary objective.

As long as governments monopolize punishment, they retain incentives to expand the penal apparatus, regardless of its effectiveness. Restitution reverses that logic. It limits bureaucratic power, restores the victim to the center of justice, and transforms punishment from a political ritual into a genuine process of moral and legal repair. Whether approached through sociology, economics, anthropology, or libertarian political philosophy, the victim - not the state - emerges as the indispensable starting point for any coherent theory of justice.

Authored by Tamuz Itai via The Epoch Times,

For months, the assumption that the Strait of Hormuz was Tehran's ultimate card dominated commentary on the war.

As a narrow waterway through which roughly one-fifth of the world's oil and a substantial share of liquefied natural gas had historically passed, it appeared to be a chokepoint Iran could close or severely disrupt at will. It did not need to destroy every tanker. Hitting a small percentage with drones, cruise missiles, speedboats, or mines would spike insurance rates, deter crews and companies, and effectively shut the strait without continuous physical control.

This idea was not new for 2026. It had long been a feature of the Iranian strategic posture, treated as both a military instrument and a political myth-proof that even under pressure Tehran retained a decisive lever over the global energy system. Parts of the Western media and independent analysts amplified the same narrative.

Relying on incomplete open-source shipping data, especially once vessels began sailing dark, many concluded that the United States had been caught unprepared and lacked a realistic path to reopen the waterway. Hormuz, they argued, was effectively closed or closable at Iran's discretion. That framing was powerful, but also incomplete.

How the Threat Has Been Eroded

The assumption that Iran's detection and targeting system could not be dismantled without dramatic escalation proved wrong. Under the U.S. Central Command, also known as CENTCOM, and with significant involvement from the Fifth Fleet and Air Force components, the United States ran a sustained effort to degrade the sensors Iran needed to find and hit ships.

Iran relied on mobile truck-mounted radars, drones, cruise missiles, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) speedboats, and naval mines. Inside the narrow strait, ships move in relatively predictable lanes. Iran combined active radars with passive electro-optical and infrared cameras on elevated terrain and islands such as Qeshm, Larak, and Abu Musa.

Mobile radars would radiate briefly to locate shipping, then shut down and move before anti-radiation missiles could arrive. Once a ship's approximate position was known, strike systems could be sent to search.

The vulnerability was that every radar emission could be detected. American aircraft responded systematically with anti-radiation missiles while visual and intelligence efforts located the passive sensors. This was the core of what some involved called "draining the swamp."

Iran had redundancy, but the number of sensors was finite. Hundreds of precision strikes gradually reduced Iran's ability to see traffic in the strait. As the detection layer thinned, the effectiveness of the strike systems declined with it.

Parallel efforts neutralized mines with unmanned vessels and declared the southern lane near Oman largely clear. Convoys moved under escort, often at night with the automated information system (AIS) off. Arleigh Burke-class destroyers with Aegis radars and standard missile (SM)-family interceptors formed the backbone; drones and Apache helicopters armed with laser-guided rockets provided additional cover. American ships also engaged IRGC speedboats that closed on the convoys.

On the commercial side, the United States addressed insurance barriers. In early March, President Donald Trump directed the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to provide political risk insurance and guarantees for maritime trade.

The DFC, working with the Treasury and CENTCOM, established a revolving reinsurance facility of roughly $20 billion-later expanded with private partners including Chubb-focused on hull, machinery, and cargo cover. Early uptake was limited. As Iranian success rates fell, more vessels joined.

Results have been significant. CENTCOM has reported assisting well over a thousand commercial vessels and moving hundreds of millions of barrels since the spring. Independent trackers often showed lower numbers because much of the traffic sailed dark. Pre-war throughput was 20 million to 21 million barrels per day.

Flows through Hormuz remain below that, but combined with the Abu Dhabi-Fujairah pipeline and Saudi Arabia's pipeline to Yanbu in the Red Sea, volumes recovered enough to keep oil prices in the $85 to $95 range-elevated, but far from the predicted catastrophe.

Not Seeing the True Picture

Public data lagged for both technical and psychological reasons. Ships that went dark during transit normally turned their AIS trackers back on afterward, so theoretically they could have been tracked and counted, yet matching was imperfect amid overlapping night movements, incomplete satellite reception, intermittent signals, and ship-to-ship transfers.

Commercial trackers attempt corrections using imagery and other data, but confidence thresholds still produce undercounts relative to what escorting forces could see.

There was also a narrative reason. The story of Iranian success and American failure fit expectations many already held. Contradictory evidence produced cognitive dissonance. The common response was to protect the original frame-by applying greater skepticism to inconvenient details and treating quieter progress as temporary.

In a contested information environment, narratives that confirm prior expectations often outlast those that require revision.

The General Principle

Hormuz illustrates a broader pattern. Leverage is often strongest while latent. The threat shapes behavior; the target hedges or hopes the card is never played. Once used at scale, incentives change. Real costs appear, and the value of neutralizing the threat rises sharply.

Adaptation follows: sensors are hunted, escorts are organized, alternative routes are accelerated, commercial workarounds are found. Over time, the original leverage delivers diminishing returns. The coercer frequently ends up weaker than before.

The pattern is not unique. In 1973, Arab oil producers cut exports and raised prices. The short-term shock was severe; the longer-term response included efficiency gains, strategic reserves, non-OPEC production, and the shale revolution.

Russia's gas cut-offs against Europe from 2021 to 2022 produced a similar arc: LNG expansion, storage, demand reduction, and alternative suppliers collapsed Moscow's share of the European market, forcing it to sell more of its supply with heavy discounts to China and others.

China's 2010 rare-earth restrictions against Japan spurred alternative mining, recycling, and substitution. In recent years, the United States has also accelerated the shift with CHIPS Act funding, Department of Defense equity stakes and loans, price-floor and offtake arrangements, and Project Vault, which includes equity stakes in key producers and a strategic minerals reserve, while expanding cooperation with partners such as Australia.

Remaining Levers and Their Limits

If the Hormuz card is already delivering diminishing returns, what options remain for Iran?

The most consequential underused lever is a more systematic campaign against Gulf energy production itself-fields, processing plants, refineries, and downstream industries. Iran has already struck these targets at a meaningful scale. What has not been fully attempted is a sustained multi-country effort at lasting destruction of capacity.

Other potential levers include intensified proxies, cyber operations, pressure on Bab el-Mandeb, residual nuclear signaling, and heavier strikes on U.S. bases or critical infrastructure. Each retains some potential.

Yet the same logic applies. Further large-scale use would accelerate the responses that reduce effectiveness. At the same time, the regime faces continuous economic pressure from the U.S. naval blockade, oil-export enforcement, and broader "Operation Economic Outcast" sanctions. Escalation under that siege significantly raises costs and shortens the runway.

Another option might be a distraction elsewhere, perhaps initiated by another country in the emerging axis of Chinese Communist Party-dependent countries, such as Russia, North Korea, or China itself.

The battle for the strait is not the entire war. It has, however, illustrated a recurring feature of strategy: geographic and resource levers look most formidable while they remain latent. Once put into continuous action, they often set in motion the forces that ultimately reduce their power.

Authored by Jeremy Portnoy via RealClearInvestigations,

The federal deficit will be $2.1 trillion when fiscal year 2026 ends on Sept. 30, the Congressional Budget Office projected in its monthly budget review.

The deficit - the gap between what the government spends and what it collects from taxes and other revenue - has never surpassed $1.8 trillion, except during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Key facts: Federal revenues are up 3% in 2026 compared to last year. Even though corporate income tax revenue has declined, income and payroll tax collections increased.

But federal spending is up 5%, according to the CBO. Interest on the national debt increased 14% compared to last year. Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and defense are also facing increased costs.

The CBO originally projected this year's deficit would be $1.9 trillion. The estimate was changed "mostly because of smaller-than-expected collections of tariff duties" after the Supreme Court struck down tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump in February.

Though Trump later imposed new tariffs, the CBO still expects federal revenue to be $250 billion less than originally anticipated. About $100 billion has been refunded to companies so far, under an order from the U.S. Court of International Trade.

Critical quote: "We've borrowed an astounding $1.8 trillion this fiscal year, with $431 billion in the month of July alone, and equating to nearly $6 billion per day," said Maya MacGuineas, president of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. "We're on track to surpass $2 trillion in borrowing this fiscal year despite not being in a recession. That is not normal."

Background: The University of Pennsylvania recently estimated that under current policy, it will likely be mathematically impossible for the U.S. to pay off its debt by the year 2048.

That was before Trump asked Congress to increase discretionary spending by 19% next year, which would be the second-largest spending increase in at least 60 years.

Summary: America's affordability crisis is the most prominent political issue in the country, yet neither party has committed to reducing government deficits. Until then, the crisis is likely to only worsen.

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