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Authored by Peter Earle via AmericanThinker.com,

A survey finding that 70% of Americans support putting half the stock of major AI companies into a public wealth fund reveals a deeper cultural shift toward viewing wealth as zero-sum and favoring redistribution of innovation rewards, unlike the more market-accepting attitude during the internet era.

Thirty years ago, the commercial internet burst onto the scene amid sweeping predictions. It would transform commerce, eliminate industries, reshape labor markets, and create fortunes on an unprecedented scale. It did all of those things. Yet there was not just remarkably little public appetite for confiscating half the equity of internet companies and redistributing it through a government-run fund: there was none. Americans largely accepted that entrepreneurs, investors, and workers who assumed extraordinary risks would also enjoy extraordinary rewards. Today, by contrast, a new survey finding that roughly seven in ten Americans support transferring half the stock of major AI companies into a public wealth fund suggests that something more profound than anxiety over a new technology is taking place.

Every technological revolution has its Luddites, however, marginal their appearance. What’s new is that today’s Luddites don’t merely want to stop the machines; they want to confiscate their owners’ property.

Certainly, artificial intelligence has generated genuine concerns. Many fear job displacement, misinformation, privacy violation, or the concentration of economic power in a handful of firms. Those concerns deserve discussion. But support for effectively nationalizing half the ownership of successful companies marks a dramatic departure from the country’s traditional understanding of property rights, entrepreneurship, and the relationship between entrepreneurship and reward.

The internet itself offers an illuminating comparison.

Few technologies have been as economically disruptive. Newspapers collapsed, retailers disappeared, travel agencies became obsolete, music stores vanished, classified advertising evaporated, and countless occupations either changed radically or ceased to exist. At the same time, the internet created entirely new industries employing millions of people while dramatically lowering costs, expanding consumer choice, and increasing productivity. Although critics worried about monopolies or privacy, proposals to seize half the ownership of companies such as Microsoft, Amazon, Google, or eBay scarcely emerged, let alone attracting something approaching majority public support.

Why has the public reaction shifted so dramatically?

One explanation is that Americans have become increasingly accustomed to viewing wealth through a zero-sum lens. For decades, political rhetoric, media coverage, and even educational institutions have increasingly emphasized inequality over wealth creation as an engine of overall prosperity. Rather than asking whether society as a whole becomes richer through innovation, discussion often centers on whether innovators have become “too rich.” When economic success itself is viewed with suspicion, redistribution naturally appears more reasonable than allowing innovators to retain the returns from their investments.

A second explanation is declining confidence in upward mobility. During the internet boom, many Americans believed they could personally participate in the gains, whether by starting businesses, purchasing stocks, or finding new career opportunities. Today, younger generations often face high housing costs, elevated student debt, and persistent pessimism about their future prospects. If people increasingly believe they won’t participate in economic growth through ordinary market participation, government intervention begins to seem like the only remaining avenue to benefit from economic progress.

A third possibility is that artificial intelligence itself feels more immediate and personal than previous technological revolutions. The internet largely complemented human labor before gradually replacing certain businesses and occupations. AI, by contrast, appears capable of performing cognitive tasks once thought uniquely human. White-collar professionals from writers, programmers, accountants, designers, and analysts now perceive direct competition from software. Fear often produces demands for political intervention that would have seemed unnecessary under more optimistic circumstances. (See the New Deal for additional evidence.)

None of this means policymakers should ignore legitimate questions surrounding AI. Governments have an appropriate role in enforcing contracts, protecting property rights, ensuring competition, prosecuting fraud, and addressing clearly demonstrated harms. But confiscating ownership after firms have invested billions of dollars in research and accepted enormous commercial risks would establish a troubling precedent extending well beyond artificial intelligence. Among other effects, inventors, and their backers would understandably ask which successful industry might be next.

The survey therefore reveals something larger than public opinion about AI. It reflects a striking evolution in American attitudes toward markets, technological, advancement, and private property. The internet transformed the economy every bit as profoundly as artificial intelligence promises to do, yet Americans overwhelmingly viewed its rewards as something to be earned rather than redistributed. If American citizens increasingly see extraordinary innovation as justification for extraordinary government force, the most important story may not be artificial intelligence at all. It may be the changing philosophy of the society deciding how to govern it.

If a majority can be persuaded that today’s successful innovators no longer deserve to own what they built, there is little reason to believe AI will be the last industry to find itself in the redistributionist crosshairs.

The new troubling development is that maritime chokepoint chaos spread overnight from the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, where Iran-backed Houthis targeted two Saudi Arabian tankers. The attacks expose yet another maritime chokepoint and risk further physical market tightening, forcing traders to price a larger war-risk premium into Brent crude futures and pushing the benchmark above $100 a barrel Thursday morning.

Oil headed to Asia generally does not flow through both chokepoints. Persian Gulf exports pass through Hormuz and sail east, while Saudi crude loaded at Yanbu enters the Red Sea and passes south through Bab el-Mandeb.

Asia takes most of Hormuz crude, with China alone absorbing nearly two-fifths. On Saudi Arabia's Red Sea route through Bab el-Mandeb, China recently accounted for more than half of exports.

With both chokepoints disrupted, we want to check back in with China to understand what levers Beijing is pulling to absorb the energy shock - this builds on our three previous notes:

• China's Oil Imports Plummet To Eight-Year Low
• Visualizing China's Role In Stabilizing Oil Markets
• China's Refiners Slash Runs To Lowest Since 2017, As Asia Refiners Slow Purchases Of Mid-East Oil

On Wednesday, Goldman commodities strategist Hongcen Wei outlined three factors that have so far allowed Beijing to contain the economic fallout from the Gulf energy shock:

1. drawing down fuel inventories,
2. switching to coal and renewables,
3. and concentrating production cuts in oil- and gas-intensive industries.

China's real GDP growth slowed to an annualized 3.6% in the second quarter from 5.3% in the first, while total energy demand still rose .4% from a year earlier in April and May. Destocking of coal, oil and NatGas added 5.4 percentage points to energy-demand growth.

Fuel substitution also softened the impact. Lower oil and gas use subtracted 1.7 percentage points, while increased consumption of coal and renewables added 2.2 points. Gasoline demand sank 23%, but EV charging jumped 60%, allowing transportation activity to migrate toward electricity.

The remaining damage was concentrated in industries heavily dependent on oil and NatGas, while industries with greater flexibility shifted toward electricity and alternative fuels.

Wei provided the full rundown on how China is absorbing the energy shock:

Major Fall in Net Imports, but Total Energy Demand Growth Still Positive. Ordinarily the largest importer of energy products shipped through the Strait of Hormuz, China has drastically reduced its net imports of fossil fuels, effectively acting as a shock absorber for global energy prices through reduced demand. Net imports of crude oil cratered in China and the rest of Asia beginning in March, but recovered in the rest of Asia to 2025 levels by June while continuing to fall in China through the first half of July (Exhibit 3).

China's net imports of oil/natural gas/coal fell 24%/7%/24% YoY in April and May reflecting YoY price jumps of 59%/49%/38% (Exhibit 4). These reductions in fossil fuel net imports were the largest source of negative total energy demand growth, representing -3.7pp/-0.3pp/-1.2pp of China's total YoY energy demand growth of +0.4% (Exhibit 5).

Exhibit 3: China Crude Oil Net Imports Continue to Fall While the Rest of Asia Recovers to 2025 Levels

Chinese total energy consumption in April and May increased by an average of 0.4%, or 52 petajoules, year-over-year. To roughly estimate the impact of the supply shock on energy consumption, we estimate counterfactual consumption growth as the average +3.1% annual total energy demand growth rate from 2014-2023.[2] Applying this rate to China's average total monthly consumption in April and May 2025 would imply 375 PJ counterfactual YoY energy demand growth. This would suggest roughly 323 PJ of demand destruction for April and May, or 2.7pp reduction in the potential YoY growth rate. China's Q2 real GDP growth fell to 3.6% after 5.3% Q1 growth quarterly annualized, slightly exceeding our China team's nudged-down June forecast of 3.5% Q2 growth but missing market expectations. Lower GDP growth reflected mostly slower government spending, but also higher energy prices and unfavorable weather conditions.

Below, we highlight three factors that helped mitigate the total demand shock.

#1 Effective Destocking of Coal, Oil and Natural Gas Filled in for Fall in Fossil Fuel Imports and Production

Importing less of its energy needs from abroad, China has turned to its domestic inventories--rather than domestic production growth--to supplement the supply of fossil fuels.

Total domestic fossil fuel production actually fell slightly YoY in April and May, with lower coal production comprising a 0.5 percentage point reduction in total energy supply growth (Exhibit 5). Domestic crude oil production was unchanged compared to April and May of last year, likely constrained by high extraction costs in China's aging brownfields.

The bulk of the rise in total energy consumption has been driven by the effective destocking of fossil fuels.

• Thermal coal inventory levels increased by 1.6%/3.7% during April/May 2026, significantly lower than the 4.7%/5.8% MoM increase of April/May 2025. Though China's coal inventory level rose this April and May, we consider the reduction in MoM additions compared to last year's flows--in other words, how much less China added to its coal inventory this April/May compared to April/May 2025--as effective destocking. Defined this way, coal stock use contributed 3.0 percentage points to total YoY demand growth (Exhibit 5).
• We estimate that oil destocking also accelerated, contributing 2.2pp to total YoY demand growth (Exhibit 5). Moreover, changes in China's visible crude oil stocks also appear directionally consistent with our implied destocking estimates of around 1mb/d in May and June, suggesting a shift from restocking in Q2 2025 to greater inventory use this year (Exhibit 6).
• Effective natural gas destocking accounted for 0.2pp of total YoY energy demand growth (Exhibit 5).

#2 Fuel Substitution to Coal and Renewables Has Limited the Demand Destruction

To avoid wider demand destruction caused by lower fossil fuel imports and production, China has increased its reliance on coal and renewables in its wider energy mix. Lower oil/natural gas use in China's overall energy demand contributed -1.6/-0.1 percentage points to its total YoY energy demand growth in April and May, while greater reliance on coal/renewables contributed +1.4/+0.8pp (Exhibit 7).

As an example of this fuel switching in practice, we observe China substituting driving with gasoline for driving with electricity. Gasoline consumption fell 23%/23%/21% YoY in April/May/June, but EV charging growth rose to 62%/60%/57% YoY. Despite much lower gasoline consumption, traffic congestion remained relatively stable, falling only 1.2% YoY in April before growing by 0.2% and 2.1% YoY in May and June (Exhibit 8). These findings are consistent with our prior reporting on China's uptick in domestic EV sales since the start of the Iran war (despite seasonally-adjusted total passenger car sales remaining flat) and may reflect substitution both in car purchases (more EVs bought) and especially in choosing which kind of energy to drive on.[3]

#3 Energy-Related Reductions in Output Are Concentrated in Oil- and Natural Gas-Reliant Sectors

Several industries that are highly oil- or natural gas-intensive have slowed production. Physical output of processed crude oil fell by 10.9% YoY in Q2 reflecting lower crude oil inputs (Exhibit 9).[4] Sulfuric acid, produced as a byproduct during oil and natural gas refining, saw 4.6% lower Q2 physical output YoY. Chemical fibers, produced with either oil or natural gas feedstocks like ethane or naphtha as inputs, saw 3.7% lower Q2 physical output YoY.

The production of the industrial chemical ethylene increased in Q2 by 1.2% YoY, rebounding from a 4.1% YoY fall in April to +2.1% and +5.5% YoY growth in May and June. Though conventional ethylene production involves steam cracking of oil feedstocks like ethane or naphtha, the recent rebound in ethylene output growth may reflect China's significant acceleration in modern coal-to-chemicals pathways like Coal-to-Olefins (CTO) where coal is gasified into syngas, synthesized into methanol, and dehydrated to form ethylene. China's use of coal in chemical production rose by 11.5% in April YoY amid the energy supply shock according to DBX Commodities, with coal-to-chemicals facilities residing atop domestic coal reserves well-positioned to facilitate the transition.

Furthermore, energy-intensive products more reliant on power than oil or natural gas feedstocks saw more resilient output growth. The production of caustic soda, a major industrial chemical, is highly electricity-intensive but does not require oil or natural gas as unique inputs. Physical output of caustic soda grew by 2.4% YoY in Q2. EV production, more reliant on power than on materials made with oil and natural gas, also increased 17.0% YoY.

The key question is how long China's energy strategy to bridge Hormuz and Red Sea disruptions can last.

China recently had 1.3 billion to 1.4 billion barrels in crude inventories, including roughly 400 million barrels accumulated during 2025. At the current import shortfall of about 3.5 million barrels a day, that recent stock build is about four months of coverage. Of course, the substitution strategy also has its limits. Coal, renewables, and EVs can replace gas-fired power and some gasoline consumption, but they cannot entirely substitute for oil used in aviation, trucking, petrochemicals, or industrial processes.

The bigger risk comes when China stops drawing on its strategic stockpile and returns aggressively to the global crude market.

Earlier today, Helima Croft, head of global commodity strategy at RBC Capital Markets, warned in a note that "war enters a dangerous phase with the Red Sea and critical infrastructure at risk." Read it here.

Professional Subscribers can access our latest energy-market intelligence, including analysis of Hormuz and other critical maritime chokepoints, through the new Marketdesk.ai.

The Indian government has ordered telecom companies to disable ?mobile data services in central parts ?of the capital Delhi, in and around the site of youth protests seeking the resignation ?of the education minister, two sources ?told Reuters on Thursday.

The companies have ?complied with the order, Reuters sources ?said.

There was ?no ?mobile data connectivity in many parts of central Delhi on Thursday evening, Reuters journalists said.

Vendors, shopkeepers and restaurants ?complained that ?they were ?unable to accept digital payments.

India’s youth protesters have called for nationwide demonstrations on Friday even as Prime Minister Narendra ?Modi’s government urged them to join talks, while shutting metro stations and mobile internet services and curtailing business in central Delhi.

The youth protesters, led by the self-named "Cockroach" Janta Party movement, have been ?camping in central Delhi since ?last ?month and are demanding the resignation of the education minister over leaks of medical school entrance test papers that affected some 2 million students in May and have been linked to several student suicides.

The protests have swelled ?into the biggest youth challenge to Modi since he came to power in 2014. Opposition parties have echoed the youth movement's demands and have disrupted the monsoon session ?of parliament that began this week.

It marks the biggest political crisis of Modi's third term, which began in 2024.

The government made ?a fresh appeal on Thursday to the protesters to join talks to resolve the crisis but they responded by calling for nationwide peaceful protests on Friday in solidarity ?with students who alleged police brutality during a march on parliament on Monday by tens of thousands of people.

Thousands of people had returned to the Jantar Mantar protest ?site by Thursday afternoon, carrying anti-government posters and chanting slogans amid heavy security deployment.

Protests also spread to other cities, including Ranchi, Pune, Thiruvananthapuram and Kolkata, local media reported.

Authorities in Delhi shut down 16 metro rail stations in and around the central parts of Delhi where the protesters have remained camped, inconveniencing thousands of commuters.

The government also ?ordered telecom firms to block mobile internet services in the area, sources told Reuters, a move that not only affected protesters but also stopped shops and restaurants from receiving ?digital payments by phone.

Separately, all offices and businesses in the Connaught Place area, the bustling central business district, were asked to shut early on Thursday by the New Delhi Traders ?Association, which ?cited an advisory from municipal authorities due to the security situation in the area.

The measures are seen as an attempt by authorities to curb the protests and prevent any fresh outbreak of violence.

More than 10,000 people had gathered on Wednesday night at the Jantar Mantar protest site. Some protesters attacked police with stones and plastic bottles, injuring a few officers, news agency ANI quoted Delhi Police as saying.

In Monday's clashes during the march on parliament, police used tear gas and canes to push back the protesters.

Earlier on Thursday, Modi said that ?special courts would be set up ?to prosecute those behind exam paper leaks, his first public response to the crisis.

"Nothing is more important than the welfare and future of our youth!" Modi posted on X.

But CJP rejected the proposal, saying what courts do after paper leaks is just one ?aspect of the problem.

"But Modi-ji, tell us why are paper leaks happening in this country in the first place?" CJP ?spokesperson Ashutosh Ranka said, ?using the Hindi honorific.

After a dismal day that saw tech stocks wrecked on the shores of hyperscalers' CapEx and inferred from Alphabet's earnings, tonight sees Intel's Lip-Bu Tan ride to the rescue with better-than-expected second-quarter results on Thursday, notching its fastest revenue growth rate for any quarter since 2011 and issuing guidance that topped expectations. 

Beat on the top- and bottom-line:

• Earnings per share: 42 cents, adjusted, versus 21 cents expected

• Revenue: $16.1 billion, versus $14.42 billion expected

Upped Guidance: For the current quarter, Intel said it expects adjusted earnings per share of 38 cents on revenue between $15.8 billion and $16.8 billion.

Analysts were expecting revenue of $15.1 billion and EPS of 27 cents, according to consensus.

"AI is driving unprecedented demand for compute," CEO Lip-Bu Tan said in the statement.

"As we continue to execute, Intel is well-positioned to capture sustainable growth across our CPU franchise."

Additionally, Intel said it's boosting its capital expenditures, targeting a "meaningful increase" next year, as it aggressively tries to morph into a manufacturer of chips for other companies.

CFO David Zinsner told CNBC's Kristina Partsinevelos that the company's latest manufacturing process, called 14A, is ahead of where older technologies were at the same point in the cycle.

INTC is up around 10% from the close...

And that narrative-confirmer is pulling all of tech higher (Nasdaq futs)...

Finally, however, Intel did not reveal a major customer for its foundry, as investors and potential customers keep waiting. 

By Michael Every of Rabobank

Unless things change dramatically, the Middle East seems set for massive escalation.

President Trump yesterday warned every missile, rocket, or drone Iran fires at ships in Hormuz will be met with the destruction of an Iranian bridge or power plant.

This morning, the IRGC says a tanker is on fire after an explosion in the strait and Kuwait is under drone attack. Moreover, the Houthis claimed attacks on two Saudi tankers in the Red Sea, raising the risks of a new global energy chokepoint besides Hormuz.

Reports say the US is surging military forces to the region, heavy bombers are being prepared, and Mossad is coordinating with the CIA. Equally, Iran’s Ghalibaf has stated there will be no safety if Iran’s security is not guaranteed, read as more or less a declaration of war against the entire region’s infrastructure and energy should its own be hit.

Worse, Iranian strikes on CIA Middle-East facilities are prompting US questions about Russian involvement, which would conflate the war more deeply with Russia-Ukraine, where epic damage to Russian energy, shipping, and logistics infrastructure continues to mount. On that note, after Kazakhstan was forced to stop piping oil via the Black Sea due Ukraine’s drone attacks, the EU is launching a mission to board Russian shadow fleet ships in the Indian Ocean; however, Russian LNG is to remain exempt from EU sanctions - realpolitik or real weakness?

In the Middle East, the UK is evacuating its remaining diplomatic personnel from Iran, just as it did the day before the Iran war started in February, but Bulgaria is aiding US military operations from its territory. That could potentially make it a target for Iranian reprisals – and it’s a NATO and EU member, each with collective defense clauses.

If we see military escalation, it’s likely to drive energy prices even higher than the $95.5 level Brent was at this morning with benchmark crack spreads at $68. However, it’s unlikely to last long. Neither the US nor Israel, nor Iran, nor the GCC can sustain a no-holds-barred war for long – and the world economy obviously can’t either. As such, we may be close to the beginning of the end of this crisis - it’s just unclear if it will prove a bridge too far for the US or Iran.

Meanwhile, the White House is considering military options in Mali, where the Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM are advancing on the capital. That risks further US overstretch. Then again, after the former imperial power France and arrivistes Russia both got a bloody nose in the country, it doesn’t look like anyone else is going to act against these jihadis – certainly not Europe, though Mali uses the West African CFA franc that is pegged to the Euro. Of course, Mali is also rich in resources.

As climactic in geoeconomics --but likely to last much longer than events in the Middle East-- yesterday saw Financial Times editor Martin Wolf ask, “Who will win the war of neo-mercantilists?”, making clear, “We are living in a mercantilist era.” We aren’t, because we don’t all want to hoard gold (yet) so it’s a neo-mercantilism that wants national-security trade surpluses – but he’s close enough. Likewise, Stephen Roach today asks in the same paper, “How long can China defy history and logic with its imbalances?” and argues, “The country is demanding far too much of a world fixated on cheap consumer goods.”

This looks a Damascene conversion for a media source that long rejected that a now undeniable reality we’ve been arguing for since 2015, along with every Western policy step that could have prevented its emergence, while instead cheering everything that accelerated its arrival.

Yet will the Establishment financial press now offer analysis that adapts to a new old world?

It seems unlikely looking at the Bloomberg response to Trump’s planned 100% generic drug tariffs with a two-year delay: “But prices will go up!” Really? Such drugs have a low labor input; shipping them in from abroad costs a lot; and this overlooks the national-security argument – a Great Power cannot be reliant on others for key medicines, among other things. (Plus, the EU says its generic exports to the US are protected by last year’s EU-US trade deal.)

In short, even the FT is now implying that if you use the terms “economic statecraft” or “neo-mercantilism,” yet default to “But prices will go up!” when they are in action, then you don’t understand either - nor that those making decisions in the US, China, and elsewhere do.

The looming implications of this are potentially explosive, and already evident:

• The US Congress is again exploring tariffs and/or sanctions to counter China’s shipbuilding dominance; the USTR says the US isn’t getting the critical minerals from China it had been promised; Boeing has asked the US to intervene over a record EU loan to Airbus; and Mercedes risks a US sales ban under Senate China bill that penalises Chinese ownership and tech, which the German car-marker had happily embraced even with that threat overhanging it.
• EU tariffs on China have accelerated Korean tire makers' exit from the country: imagine what broader EU tariffs might achieve (beyond “But prices will go up!”) “Voila! l'art de gouverner par l'économie!” – indeed, many of the early neo-mercantilists were Europeans. That said, a report calls the bloc’s 2040 target to double its electrification an “unattainable dreamland.”
• Nvidia's CEO unsurprisingly defended Chinese AIs that might use lots of his chips; Axios reports that an OpenAI AI models “went rogue during testing.”; and AI-driven soaring memory chips costs are forcing others, such as Asian carmakers, to consider price hikes.
• In markets, where this all ultimately ends up, the White House is still looking at the Fed. Bloomberg reports Barr may be ousted over her conduct during the SVB bailout. That could open the door for another pro-Trump voice on the FOMC, as a legal sword still hangs over Cook’s tenure and a recent Supreme Court ruling has opened the door to even more sweeping changes.

More mundane, today saw Aussie jobs data at 76.3K, which is the equivalent of a US payrolls print of 1,000K. That’s after news that the limp economy is seeing the worst per capita income trend since WW1. What, beyond bad data, could allow that staggering divergence? Expect more questions about political economy to erupt – and more resistance from the usual crowd.

To conclude, are Hormuz and the Red Sea a bridge too far for the US or Iran? Is the emergence of neo-mercantilism a bridge too far for traditional macro-commentary (or macro-ideology)? Is the Fed a bridge too far for the White House? All three are linked: we have to wait for the outcomes.